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I. Introduction 
In his regular Monday morning column in The Daily Telegraph, (4 June 2018), the economist, Roger 
Bootle wrote, 
“Market failure applies most notably with regard to executive pay.  In practice, senior pay 
awards are decided by a cosy cabal, reminiscent of the worst of trade union excesses.1  It isn’t 
usually the level of pay that infuriates people.  It is rather the often sketchy relationship 
between pay and performance and, especially, the lack of appropriate downsides in the event 
of individual or corporate failure.  This is the very opposite of capitalism in the raw, which 
depends as much upon the purging effect of failure as the incentivising effect of success.” 
The basic problem is that CEOs, and other senior managers, are largely remunerated in ways that 
depend on the level of equity prices, also known as the bonus culture, and equity holders have limited 
liability.  With unlimited upside potential, but limited downside, this puts an equity holder into the 
position of having a call option on the residual assets of the enterprise.  The value of such options 
increases with risk.  This is because when the downside risk occurs, those with limited liability can 
shift the risk onto the other creditors, depositors, bond holders, trade creditors and taxpayers. 
In simple terms equity holders with limited liability are insured against the risk of really bad 
outcomes.  When such (tail) risk occurs, such equity holders can shift the costs arising onto others, 
e.g. employees, creditors of various kinds and, in the last resort, taxpayers.   
The limited liability of equity holders is, we contend, by far the biggest source of moral hazard and 
risk shifting in a capitalist economy. Yet the ‘moral hazard fundamentalists’, to use Tim Geithner’s 
phrase, have tended to focus on less central features of our system, such as deposit insurance, mutual 
fiscal support and other forms of insurance against adversity.  Has there been some (unconscious?) 
bias in the identification of ‘moral hazard’? 
A consequence of limited liability for shareholders is that the return on their investment, as a function 
of the profitability of the firm in which they have an equity share, is flat when the company is doing 
badly or becomes insolvent, but is strongly upwards sloping when the public company is doing well.  
This is shown graphically in Figure 1 below. 
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With a return structure of this kind, the shareholders are led to prefer a riskier strategy, as shown in 
the figure, with an even chance of an outcome of A and B, rather than a completely safe policy, as 
shown in the diagram at point C.  So, shareholders have an innate preference to encourage 
management to take on riskier activities.  Such shareholder preference for risk is somewhat abated by 
loss aversion, see for example Kahneman (2012).2  But that, in turn, is reduced by appropriate 
diversification, so that the loss involved on any single portfolio holding is limited.3  So, the 
implication is that limited liability naturally leads shareholders to push management to adopt riskier 
strategies than would be socially optimal.   
In earlier years the pressure on management was mitigated by the fact that managers were primarily 
paid by a cash salary unrelated to equity valuation.  Moreover, other considerations, such as 
reputation and pride in developing a successful company over the long term, had the effect of 
constraining managers willingness to take on risk.  But, one of the other possible incentives on 
managerial behaviour, as a result, was to spend resources on activities that might bolster managerial 
reputation and personal comfort, rather than maximising profits.  Such considerations involved size 
and spending money on managerial perks, including not only such perks as company planes and 
                                                          
2   D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, (London: UK: Penguin Books), (2012).  Part IV on Choices, pp 269-
376, focusses on loss aversion. 
3 The paper by John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon, ‘Systemic harms and shareholder value’ (The Journal of Legal 
Analysis, Volume 6, Issue 1, 2014 https://academic.oup.com/jla/article/6/1/35/933345) argues that – with 
respect to systemic risk at least – diversified shareholders do care, as the systemic spillovers – to a limited extent 
– will produce losses throughout their diversified portfolio. 
A 
B 
C 
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chauffeur driven cars, but also fancy, prestigious architecture, head offices, etc.  The cry went up, as a 
result, that managerial incentives should become better aligned with the interests of shareholders, 
possibly one of the worst ideas developed by academic economists in recent decades!  
Partly in response to public attitudes then, about soaring managerial pay and perks, President Clinton 
introduced measures in 1993,  
“when he effectively set a $1 million limit on directors’ pay by making anything above that 
level non-tax deductible for companies.  However, in the small print of his legislation, was a 
clause that specified payments with performance conditions were exempt from the $1 million 
rule.  That effectively meant company boards boosted all salaries to $1 million and paid 
bonuses and extras in stock options that directors could cash in for shares at a later date.  This 
prompted an explosion in executive awards…”, Hargreaves, op cit., page 77. 
The result of such alignment of managerial incentives with those of shareholders, in some large part 
consciously done, resulted in there being the exact same incentive on management to give priority to 
policies that would maximise equity valuation; naturally this would generally lead them to pursue 
additional risk.  Moreover, the expected lifetime incumbency of most CEOs is relatively short, five 
years or less, and that means that the incentive on them is to maximise short-term equity valuations.4  
This can most easily be achieved by accepting a riskier financial structure, e.g. buybacks to increase 
leverage and raise RoE, reducing the headcount of employment, and cutting out such longer-term 
investment, notably in R&D, whose return was unlikely to become clear for a long time.5   
While the moral hazard inherent in limited liability equity usage has currently slipped under the 
radar,6 this was decidedly not so in the 18th and 19th centuries, as recorded in Section II.  From the 
South Sea Bubble onwards, the moral hazard dangers of limited liability equity financing was 
prominent in the minds of all concerned in the Victorian era, investors, entrepreneurs and the 
authorities.  In Section II of this paper, we document the historical record of using unlimited liability, 
and then double liability in the case of national banks in the USA, with also reference to a few 
instances of applying particular liability requirements to specific classes of equity holders. 
The basic reason why unlimited, or multiple, liability requirements for equity holders became 
progressively abandoned during the latter part of the 19th and first half of the 20th century was that 
these required that such equity holders had both wealth (to meet such potential liability), knowledge 
about other equity holders and the enterprise, and sufficient power to prevent the enterprise becoming 
                                                          
4 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Holger Spamann in ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at 
Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008’, Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2010, show that managers 
were able to cash in a lot of the profits before the collapse. Bebchuk and Spamann in "Regulating Bankers' Pay" 
(2009). Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. 
Paper 634 (the Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 98:247) deal with the the moral hazard inherent in bankers’ pay. 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling in “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), 305-360, dealt with the distinction between 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. 
5   There is a counter-argument pointing to the high stock market valuations of tech companies which during 
their early lives can be expected to pay out nothing; with the implication that this shows that shareholders and 
management do give proper full valuation to longer-term future returns.  But the prospects for such companies 
are inherently risky, and it is the lure of potentially massive future returns, with an offsetting significant 
probability of total collapse, that attracts investors, rather than the long-term nature of their activities per se.  
6   Though see Schwarcz, “The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About 
Limited Liability,” 90 Notre Dame Law Review 1 (2014), also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364126. 
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unduly risky.  In other words, in an unlimited liability world, equity holders had to be predominantly 
‘insiders’; equities then were just too risky for ‘outsiders’ to hold.  
What then happened towards the end of the 19th century was that the scale of the efficient enterprise, 
e.g. steel production, chemicals, railways, banks, etc., etc., became sufficiently large that the required 
equity base (if the enterprise was not to become too excessively leveraged) became too large for 
insiders, e.g. family and friends, to finance on their own.   Equity finance now had to be provided by 
the much larger mass of outsiders, who had neither the power to control the working of the enterprise, 
nor detailed information, nor often the wealth to face unlimited, or even multiple, liability.  As set out 
in more detail in Section II, there was a tendency in the US during the 1920s to encourage a wider 
range of (outsider) shareholding.  When the Depression hit in the early 1930s, attempts to call on the 
additional liability of such outside shareholders proved to have high transaction costs, together with 
generating considerable political opposition.  The result was a general acceptance of limited liability 
for all, which has continued until today. 
As The Economist wrote in 1926:- 
The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless inventor of the principle of 
limited liability, as applied to trading corporations, a place of honor with Watt and 
Stephenson, and other pioneers of the Industrial Revolution. The genius of these men 
produced the means by which man’s command of natural resources was multiplied many 
times over; the limited liability company, the means by which huge aggregations of capital 
required to give effect to their discoveries were collected, organized, and efficiently 
administered. 
The Economist, 18 December 1926 
Nevertheless, the criticism of limited liability companies has several facets; it is argued that it leads to 
managers assuming excessive risk, being overpaid, and failing to undertake sufficient long-term 
investment, especially R&D.7  The first two criticisms, excessive risk and excessive pay, were 
particularly levied at banks and other financial intermediaries in the aftermath of the Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC).  There have been a variety of proposals aimed at checking or preventing such 
malfunctions.  One set of such proposals has focussed on limiting the business structures of banks and 
other financial intermediaries.  Examples of such proposals include narrow banking in various guises, 
ringfencing of core retail financial structures, and a variety of other regulatory measures.  A recent 
addition to this set is by Conti-Brown, arguing for the abolition of limited liability for Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), unless they become very highly capitalised.   
                                                          
7  In a recent article entitled ‘Rethink the purpose of the corporation’ (Financial Times, 12 December 2018), 
Martin Wolf criticises the mantra of shareholder value maximization affirming that in the cases of highly 
leveraged banking the Anglo American model of corporate governance does not work. He refers to a number of 
books – including Colin Mayer’s 2018 Prosperity – that suggest that capitalism is substantially broken. In a 
similar vein, John Plender in “Shareholders dethroned as rulers of value” (Financial Times, 3 January 2019), 
criticises the exisiting corportate governance model of shareholder primacy and advocates the redefinition of 
directors’ legal duties to other stakeholders, following investors’ greater emphasis on environmental and social 
factors in corporate performance, while Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson in “Beyond the bottom line” (Financial 
Times, 5/6 January 2019) also questions the doctrine of shareholder primacy and quoting Colin Mayer’s 
Prosperity suggests a broader social purpose, arguing that non-shareholders are ready to try something different. 
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Another set of responses, aimed more widely at the general governance structure of (public) 
corporations, has considered such remedies as two-tier governing boards, à la German system, and 
changing the statutory duty of governing boards, for example as argued by Schwarcz.  
A third, and final, set of proposals would adjust the link aligning the interests of shareholders and 
managers, by imposing additional duties on managers, either through tougher legal requirements, (see 
Kokkinis, 2018)8 or by changing the incentive and remuneration terms for management.  We further 
discuss the proposals by Conti-Brown, Schwarcz and Kokkinis in Section III.  Several of these 
alternative proposals have involved extending the ambit of the law, either criminal or civil, to cover 
managerial failings and excessive risk taking.  But taking risks, unless spectacularly egregious, is not 
illegal.  Moreover, all too often the managers who have led firms down the garden path to failure did 
not even appreciate the scale of risks that (s)he was assuming or the likelihood of those risks 
materialising. 
Perhaps the most widely supported proposal is to broaden the legal requirements to be applied to 
corporate Boards and/or senior executives to incorporate certain social responsibilities.  Whereas this 
might salve the conscience of the relevant regulators, we doubt that it would be effective, for several 
reasons.  First, so long as management is paid in the same fashion, the bonus culture, it will remain in 
their self-interest to maximise short-term equity valuations; and the shareholders to whom 
management ultimately answer will also have the same incentive.  Second it would be hard ever to 
prove in a court of law that those required to follow wider social objectives had ex ante consciously 
chosen not to do so.  Thus it would be extremely difficult to enforce such obligations by ex post 
sanctions.  Third, it runs into the criticism so forcefully expressed by Milton Friedman in 1970, and 
more fully outlined in footnote 91 below, that such a measure would lead to an inappropriate 
confusion of political and business objectives. 
Instead, our proposal, set out in Section IV, is to move to a system with two classes, or tiers, of equity 
holders; to wit ‘insiders’ with additional information about, and power to influence, managerial 
decisions, and ‘outsiders’, those without such powers.  There are already distinctions in some cases 
between shares with voting rights, and those without; and there are many tiers of debt obligations.  
One of the main problems of unlimited, or multiple, liability was that it seemed unfair, and politically 
unacceptable, to penalize ‘outside’ shareholders, especially retail individual investors who had little 
knowledge, and no power to influence, the policies that had led to the bad outcome. 
Thus our proposal is to apply a distinction between a class of ‘insiders’, who should be subject to 
multiple liability, and ‘outsiders’, who would retain limited liability, as at present. 9  So, for the 
ordinary shareholder there would be no change.  Such a scheme obviously involves making a 
distinction, which must be inevitably somewhat arbitrary, between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  We 
discuss how such a border might be defined, and such other calibrations as might be necessary in 
Section IV.  There is, to be sure, a particular problem with respect to (large) institutional investors.  
Sometimes they choose to behave passively, as if ‘outsiders’; and sometimes they engage actively 
with management, as if ‘insiders’; and they can even switch from one role to the other.  We propose in 
this respect a mechanism for institutional self-selection. 
                                                          
8   Andreas Kokkinis, ‘Corporate Law and Financial Instability’, (London, UK: Routledge), (2018). 
9 Heny Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman in ‘Towards unlimited liability for corporate tort’ The Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 100, No. 7 (May 1991), pp. 1879-1934 argue in favour of a distinction based on type of liability 
from the perspective of tort law. 
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While we believe that such a two-tier equity system should be the ultimate objective, the transitional 
costs of moving there in one single step would be far too great.  There is no experience of how such a 
two tier system might work, so it would be a step in the dark.  It would involve a sudden change in the 
contractual status of all those now categorised as ‘insiders’, which would be strongly resented, 
politically opposed, and could reasonably be regarded as unfair. 
So our actual, practical, proposal, borrowing from an idea put forward first by Conti-Brown, 
discussed at greater length in Section III, is to limit such a two-tier system to Systemically Important 
Financial Intermediaries (SIFIs), which could also be given the alternative of operating with a much 
higher equity ratio. 
One advantage of this proposal is that it might be capable of extension to auditing firms and Credit 
Rating Agencies, even though they do not hold shares in the firms that they audit/rate.  Also such a 
two-tier system could/should allow fines for corporate misconduct to be applied solely, or primarily, 
to ‘insider’ shareholders, and not be imposed (inappropriately) on all shareholders, including 
‘outsiders’.  This would not only be much fairer, but also have a stronger, and more direct, incentive 
effect on management to prevent misconduct.  This is discussed in Section V. 
Indeed, one of the purposes of the exercise is to restore a sense of fairness with respect to the costs 
and benefits facing individuals placed in different circumstances.  When a financial crisis, involving a 
corporate insolvency, occurs, lots of ‘smaller’ people, such as workers, trade creditors and small 
investors, lose a lot, whereas it appears that the senior mangers of the financial institutions at the heart 
of the crisis can walk away relatively unscathed.  Even if the managers did nothing wrong in a legal 
sense, neither did the smaller people who got hurt.  In our view, the political uproar following the 
Great Financial Crisis was not caused so much by the State stepping in to bail out the institution, but 
rather by the fact that the private sector managers, who were largely responsible, were not subject to 
much heavier sanction.10   
Section VI concludes.   
 
II. Historical record of limited liability 
 
Commercial enterprises had been legally structured as partnerships with unlimited liability until the 
19th century. Limited liability was a legal innovation of the 19th century. It became one of the 
constituents elements of the joint stock company (Société Anonyme, S.A. in France or Spain, 
Aktiengesselschaft or A.G. in Germany), though the advent of this corporate form preceded the 
advent of limited liability (the name ‘company’ is typically used in the UK, while the US uses the 
term ‘corporation’).  
 
The principles of partnership and unlimited liability had been considered as ‘natural and beneficent’ 
in the early 19th century,11 since they promoted responsibility and accountability.  
 
                                                          
10 It is also possible to impose financial consequences on management via sanctions. However, as we further 
discuss below, a major problem is that the imposition of sanctions by regulatory bodies – in itself a time 
consuming exercise – has led in the UK to very few and generally small fines on individuals, notwithstanding 
the introduction of the Senior Management and Certification Regime (SM&CR). 
11 See Paddy Ireland (2008), “Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate irresponsibility”, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 34 (5): 837–856, 
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Under limited liability, a shareholder can participate in the growth of the company but his or her 
liability is restricted to the amount invested in the company. If the company as an entity endowed with 
legal personality12 goes bankrupt, the shareholders’ liability remains limited to the value of their 
investments, and shareholders have no personal liability for the company’s debts. Thus the company 
is liable for the rest of the debt obligations.13  
 
While it is widely accepted that joint stock companies with limited liability and separate legal 
personality contributed to the expansion of the capitalist system, there have been misgivings from the 
beginning about the benefits of this legal form for banks (and insurance companies). Those 
misgivings have returned to haunt us in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
 
As stated by Charles Dumas in his recent book on Populism and Economics, ‘an awkward question 
exposed by the ebbing of the financial crisis is whether the limited liability company, a cornerstone of 
the world’s economic system for more than a century, played a part in causing and prolonging that 
crisis and therefore now needs reform”.14 Limited liability is after all ‘a major privilege’ that allows 
shareholders as well as senior directors or managers to enjoy the upside from their commercial 
activity while limiting their exposure to losses in the event of failure or bankruptcy (‘skewed 
incentives’).15  
 
History provides a range of different liability regimes, from unlimited liability to double or multiple 
liability and then to single limited liability. This Section II is divided into four subsections. Firstly, we 
examine the record of double liability for banks in the USA. Secondly, we focus on the UK 
experience with special mention to the collapse of City of Glasgow Bank. The last two subsections 
very briefly consider the history of double liability Canada and some examples of limiting liability in 
a few European jurisdictions. 
 
Historical evidence supports our proposal for a different liability regime for banks that we refer to as 
‘intermediate’ or ‘partial’ liability (a category between limited and unlimited liability) and which is an 
alternative to the current regime of shareholder limited liability.  
 
                                                          
12 The relationship between limited liability and the fiction of a company’s legal personality requires further 
research which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
13 See Amy and David A. Westbrook, "Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets," 
96 Nebraska Law Review 688 (2018) and https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3200415 
The idea that shareholders ought to bear more responsibility ties into the fundamental anxiety of creating legal 
persons, that the fiction won’t hold up under pressure.   That the banks will dissolve, be floated, whatever, and 
real people will be hurt, but no real people will be responsible.  So much of the 19th century law, e.g., par value, 
s/h appraisal rights, etc., can be seen as making sure the firm is really “there” for the S/H and for third parties. 
See generally Morton Horwitz. Much of the 20th century can be seen as the whittling away of such devices for 
making corporations more solid, in the name of entrepreneurship, risk taking, innovation, and the like.The 
classic relatively recent statement was the last decision in the tortuous Disney litigation, in which truly bad 
board decisions were ultimately defended under the business judgment rule, in order to ensure that capital would 
be put at risk, people would agree to direct such capital, etc. Amy Westbroook has gone so far as to argue that, 
absent serious self-dealing, the board’s legal responsibility has, as a practical matter, all but disappeared.  It 
simply isn’t litigable in Delaware.  See “Does Banking Law Have Something to Teach Corporate Law about 
Director  Duties.”  http://washburnlaw.edu/profiles/faculty/activity/westbrook-amy.html 
14 See Charles Dumas, Populism and Economics, Profile books (2018), page 166. 
15 Ibid, page 166-167. 
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II.1 The US historical record on limited liability and the experience of double liability 
 
The first modern limited liability law was enacted by the State of New York in 1811 for 
manufacturing companies.16 New Hampshire followed in 1816, and Connecticut in 1818.  
 
The US Congress, through the passage of the National Banking Act of 1863, established double 
liability for national banks, providing that “each shareholder shall be liable to the amount of the par 
value of the shares held by him, in addition to the amount invested in such shares”.17 Double liability 
meant that  shareholders could be assessed for an additional amount equal to the paid-in capital of the 
bank if the bank were to be placed into receivership. Thus, the actual amount of equity that acted as a 
buffer against losses from the depositors’ perspective was more than the amount of paid-in capital and 
accumulated retained earnings. 
 
“Following the implementation of the federal double liability system, States continued to adopt 
similar programs for their state-chartered banks and they implemented double liability rules for bank 
shareholders (…) Most of these state provisions were closely modeled on the National Bank Act”.18  
The federal structure of US Government led to a system of decentralized corporate law with single 
limited liability laws co-existing with double liability laws for banks in the 19th and early 20th 
century.  As stated above, under double liability, bank shareholders were liable not only for the value 
of their investments, but also for the portion of a bank’s debt in the case of insolvency.19  
 
Single shareholder liability was adopted by banks in more rapidly growing States. States with more 
highly developed economies and banking systems, which had more to lose from banking instability, 
and states with a history of financial instability tended to adopt double liability in order to encourage 
more circumspect banking practices.20 It has been argued that “since risk-prone agricultural states 
were more likely to adopt double liability, and that since agricultural crises during the period were a 
principal cause of bank failures, in years of severe agricultural distress, double liability states would 
appear more risky than single liability states.” 21 In any case, given the flight of capital from States 
with unlimited or double liability to States with limited liability, the latter acquired greater popularity.  
 
                                                          
16 See Kevin Forbes, “Limited Liability and the Development of the Business Corporation”, Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization , Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 163-177, fn 4. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/764920?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents  
17 National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. 
18 See Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, “Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications” 
27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31, 1992, p. 37. 
19 Ibid, p. 33: “Double liability transforms shareholders from investors seeking to advantage themselves at the 
expense of other investors who benefit themselves by the decreasing the riskiness of these firms”. See also 
Howard Bodenhorn, “Double Liability at Early American Banks”, NBER Working Paper No. 21494, August 
2015, revised January 2017. 
20 Richard Grossman,  ‘Fear and greed: The evolution of double liability in American banking, 1865–1930’, 
(2007), Explorations in Economic History 44, 59–80, 61 
21 Ibid, (Grossman), 64 
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The effect of the end of double liability was masked by the move by banks from making loans to 
holding government debt,22 as well as by state anti-branching regulations and the regulatory systems’ 
inability to cope with a growing and more integrated and complex economy.23 
 
The 1920s saw an unusually high number of bank failures. There were thirty-five clusters of 
suspended banks (182 suspended banks in all) between 1921 and 1929 largely in rural states.24 It may 
have been due to the over-expansion of agriculture arising from increased demand for produce in 
World War I. This was followed by an agricultural depression with consequential loan defaults. The 
1926 banking panic in Florida and Georgia was, however, the result of a land boom in these states, 
and businesses linked to this including interstate roads, railways and ports. For example, in Georgia 
the 1926 series of runs was so severe (70 banks were closed within 3 days) that newspaper reporting 
was restricted.25 
 
While there is some evidence of a correlation between the use of double shareholder liability and 
fewer bank defaults it is not clear if there is a causation link and, if so, in what direction causation 
runs.26 Moreover by the early 1920s in the US any relationship between the two had dissolved and 
banks were very exposed to both, agricultural price collapse and bank runs.  
  
Bank failures multiplied between 1929 and 1933. As Macey & Miller note, these failures ultimately 
resulted in political pressure that led to the abandonment of double liability.27 The creation of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was seen by many as a better solution to bank runs than 
double liability. “In 1933 Congress repealed double liability for newly-issued national bank shares; 
                                                          
22 Eugene White, Rethinking the regulation of banking: choice or incentives? (December 2010), mimeo, Rutgers 
University, 
23 Eugene White, The regulation and reform of the American banking system, 1900-1929, (Princeton University 
Press, 1983) 
24 Lee Davison and Carlos Ramírez ‘Local banking panics of the 1920s: identification and determinants’, (2014) 
Journal of Monetary Economics 66, 164-177 
25 Ibid. 
26  Anderson, Barth and Choi, ‘Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness 
of Double Liability before and during the Great Depression’, (2018), FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper 
No. 2018-05, 22 October, show that in the years 1926-1932 double liability did not seem to reduce banks’ risk-
taking, as measured by capital and cash ratios.  They ascribe this finding to a supposed decline in depositor 
monitoring of double liability banks. 
 
But retail depositors generally have neither the capacity nor, in most cases, the incentive to monitor their own 
banks, preferring to leave this to regulators or other specialised monitoring agencies. We doubt, but do not 
know, whether the State-chartered banks of New York and New Jersey, the base for the econometric test, had 
much in the way of large, wholesale deposits. 
  
As the authors note, p. 5, earlier studies had found that double liability “became less effective in the 1920s due 
to the broadening of stock ownership during the economic boom….” This was the era of the divorce between 
ownership and control, also see Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, “The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property” (Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 1932).  Control was shifting to managers.  At this juncture bank 
managers were, we believe, rarely given (double liability) stock options. Instead we surmise that their cash 
salary would be positively related to the size and profitability of their bank, while the worst that could happen to 
them if their bank did badly would be to lose their job, i.e. that their remuneration function was akin to that of a 
limited liability shareholder. So, as control shifted from a small group of closely connected shareholders to 
managers, the incentive of the latter would be to take advantage of the reputed safety of double liability to 
reduce capital and cash ratios. 
27 Supra, Macey & Miller, p. 37. “As one author noted in 1936, the double liability effectively bankrupt[s] many 
innocent stockholders who have taken no part in the active management and control of the bank.” 
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and in 1935, it extinguished all double liability for national bank stock provided that a bank gave a six 
months notice of termination. Federal double liability was all but moribund after 1934”.28 
 
There is some evidence that double liability did serve to stabilise the US financial system, but the 
costs, including legal costs, of pursuing thousands of small shareholders to draw extra money from 
them, brought the whole system into disrepute when so many banks collapsed in the 1930s.29 The use 
of double liability declined during the 1930s following the lack of depositor confidence in the banking 
system and the introduction of federal deposit insurance via the Banking Act of 1933.30 The 
bankruptcies of many shareholders who had taken no part in the management of failed banks 
generated political pressure on States to repeal double liability laws. It appears that prior to the 1930s 
double liability shares had provided beneficial returns to shareholders but that this positive position 
started to reverse in the 1930s. In the period 1930-34 there was a substantial reduction in shareholder 
recoveries.31 
There were of course other regulatory factors which influenced risk-taking at State-level including 
capital and reserving requirements and branching restrictions in addition to introduction of deposit 
insurance and more effective banking supervision.32 The dire economic situation in the Great 
Depression33 led to a general distrust in equity investments.  
 
Notwithstanding the problems in administering the double liability rule,34 some scholars continue to 
argue that the basic premise of double liability created a system of incentives and shareholder 
monitoring for banks, which instilled sound banking practices and limited reckless risk-taking.35 
 
II.2 UK experience of unlimited and limited liability 
 
Unlimited liability was the norm in the UK until the 1850s. The advent of joint stock companies 
following the passage of  the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 did not limit shareholder liability. 
Indeed, creditors of a joint stock company could enforce by execution not only against the assets of 
the company but also against the property of any shareholder. In 1853 a Royal Mercantile Laws 
Commission was established to study modifications to liability of partners. As part of its evidence 
                                                          
28 Ibid, 38. 
29 See Charles Calomiris has written about this. For a recent paper see Charles W. Calomiris and Elliot S.M, 
“Who owned Citibank? Familiarity Bias and Business Network Influences on Stock Purchases 1925-1929”, 
NBER Working Paper 24431 http://www.nber.org/papers/w24431, March 2018. See also Charles W. Calomiris 
and Berry Wilson, “Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930s “Capital Crunch” and the Scramble to 
Shed Risk”, Journal of Business, 2004, vol. 77, no. 3, 2004, the University of Chicago. 
30 Supra, Grossman, 64 
31 Berry Wilson and Edward Kane, ‘The demise of double liability as an optimal contract for large-bank 
stockholders’, (December 1996), NBER Working Paper Series, WP 5848 
32 Supra, (Grossman), 75 
33 See “The Key to Industrial Capitalism: limited liability”, The Economist, 23rd December 1991, 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/1999/12/23/the-key-to-industrial-capitalism-limited-
liability “Shares were first issued in the 16th century, by Europe's new joint-stock companies, led by the 
Muscovy Company, set up in London in 1553 to trade with Russia. (Bonds, from the French government, made 
their debut in 1555.) Equity's popularity waxed and waned over the next 300 years or so, soaring with the South 
Sea and Mississippi bubbles, then slumping, after both burst in 1720. But share-owning was mainly a gamble 
for the wealthy few, though by the early 19th century in London, Amsterdam and New York trading had moved 
from the coffee houses into specialised exchanges.” In 1932, “America's GDP was around 60% of its 1929 
value, 25% of the workforce out of work, and the Dow wavering at about one-seventh of its pre-crash high.” 
34 Supra, Macey & Miller, 39-55 for an excellent analysis of these problems. 
35 Ibid. p. 32. 
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gathering the Commission issued a questionnaire including questions related to banks, to which 
responses indicated a lower support for changing the liability laws in the case of banks.36 The 
responses reflected ‘three perceived characteristics of banks: the special nature of bank’s creditors, the 
effects of unlimited liability on the risk of a bank run (…) and the influence of unlimited liability on 
the quality of a bank’s capital and its shareholders”.37The Commission’s Report on the Mercantile 
Laws and Amendments to the Law of Partnership was published in 1854. 
The first Limited Liability Act for companies was enacted in 1855. The legislature appeared to be 
suspicious of banks (and insurance firms) and thus they were excluded.38  As Ricardo eloquently 
wrote, the distinctive feature of the banker begins when he uses the money of others; as long as he 
uses his own money he is only a capitalist.39 As a result of the company law changes in 1855 there 
was a major rise in the number of limited liability companies to nearly 5,000 firms in England, and to 
an expansion in equity finance. 
Shareholders in banks and insurance companies gained statutory permission for limited liability in 
1862. “By the 1870s, there were still circa 70 English banks which were companies with unlimited 
shareholder liability and shares traded on stock markets. However, only seven English banks took 
advantage of the 1862 Act” which permitted limited liability.40  The reason why so few banks chose 
limited liability had largely to do with confidence and the avoidance of bank runs. The well-
established banks expected that by staying with the unlimited liability system they would inspire 
greater trust in their customers.41  Both bank shareholders and depositors believed that unlimited 
liability made for a more stable banking system because the liability of shareholders was an effective 
constraint on risk shifting and excessive risk taking.42  
A great concern in the 19th century was the ‘spectral nature’ of the joint stock company. In particular 
there was an ever present worry “that incorporated banks might evaporate and disappear since they 
were not real people”.43 However, the position against limited liability began to change after the 
collapse in 1878 of the City of Glasgow Bank. 
                                                          
36 Matthew Willinson, “Were banks special? Contrasting viewpoints in mid-nineteenth century Britain”, Bank of 
England Staff Working Paper No. 755, September 2018 
37 Ibid. p. 8. 
38As quoted by Paddy Ireland, an early critic of limited liability, Edward William Cox, had written in 1856 that 
the law of partnership had been: … “[T]hat he who acts through an agent should be responsible for his agent’s 
acts, and that he who shares the profits of an enterprise ought also to be subject to its losses; that there is a moral 
obligation, which it is the duty of the laws of a civilised nation to enforce, to pay debts, perform contracts and 
make reparation for wrongs. Limited liability is founded on the opposite principle and permits a man to avail 
himself of acts if advantageous to him, and not to be responsible for them if they should be disadvantageous; to 
speculate for profits without being liable for losses; to make contracts, incur debts, and commit wrongs, the law 
depriving the creditor, the contractor, and the injured of a remedy against the property or person of the 
wrongdoer, beyond the limit, however small, at which it may please him to determine his own liability”. See 
Paddy Ireland (2008), “Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate irresponsibility”, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 34 (5): 837–856, https://academic.oup.com/cje/article/34/5/837/1700679  
39 This citation of Ricardo is made by Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street (1873), [reprint edition by Arno Press, 
New York, 1978 of the 1915 ed. published by Smith, Elder & Co., London] p.21. 
40 John Turner, ‘The development of English company law before 1900’, (2017), Queen's University Centre for 
Economic History (QUCEH), Queen's University Belfast, Working Paper Series, No. 2017-01, 41  
41 Ron Harris,‘The private origins of the private company: Britain 1862 - 1907’, (June 2013) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, Volume 33, Issue 2, 339–378, 355 
42 Supra (Turner), 124-125. See also Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875, pp. 274-275. 
43 David Westbrook, Between citizen and state; an introduction to corporation law, (Paradigm Publishers, 
Boulder Colorado, 2007) 
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The Scottish Banking System and the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank 
In the 19th century Scotland had its own distinct banking system, different from the rest of the UK. 
Scotland had a large number of joint-stock banks but only the three chartered banks (Bank of 
Scotland, Royal Bank of Scotland and British Linen Company) had limited liability.44  
 
There was a global recession through the 1870s and into the 1890s. Known as the “long depression”, 
it had swept from Eastern Europe and Germany to the UK and across the Atlantic where it brought to 
grief a group of the “robber barons”. However, paradoxically, the origins of this global affliction may 
be found in the rapid growth of wheat production in the newly opened prairies under the Homestead 
Act 1862. US wheat production rose from 170,000 bushels each year in 1866 to 322,000 in 1873 at 
the start of the crisis.45 In parallel, the price of wheat fell from $2.95 per bushel in 1866 to $1.78 in 
1873.46 Much of the wheat was shipped to Europe where it under-cut the price of grain from Eastern 
Europe and Russia resulting in economic destitution and was, in part, responsible for the start of 
waves of immigration to America through the rest of the century and beyond.  
 
Against this background, the City of Glasgow Bank had expanded its lending overseas during the 
boom of the 1860s. It invested in illiquid industrial assets and its portfolio was very concentrated. 
Other banks had reduced their lending to industry and moved their funds to the liquid London money 
market.47 
 
Liquidity pressures had been building in the UK’s banking system from early 1878 and this 
contraction may have been the issue which finally put paid to the City of Glasgow Bank.48 
 
The failure of the City of Glasgow Bank was due to a mixture of unscrupulous directors and poor 
corporate governance. The directors lent the bank’s money to themselves and their associates and 
were not able to repay what had been borrowed. Within professional circles in Scotland, the bank was 
“viewed with suspicion and regarded as a risky institution…the City of Glasgow Bank was never 
highly esteemed outside the circle of its dupes and seems to have been a long-continued fraud”. 49 It 
can be argued that problems are likely when bank ownership and lending policies start to diverge.50 
This may necessitate either a change in corporate governance or much more stringent regulatory 
supervision or both. 
 
The high concentration of the bank’s lending is evident in that “just four borrowers accounting for 
75% of total loans at the time of collapse. These four were all local businesses deeply involved with 
Indian and Australasian trade: James Morton & Co., John Innes Wright & Co., Smith Fleming & Co. 
and James Nicol Fleming.”51 There were land reclamation projects for port development in Bombay 
                                                          
44  Lawrence White, Free banking in Britain: theory, experience and debate, 1800–1845, (Second edition, 
Institute of Economic Affair, London, 1996), 37-38 
45  Robert Sobel, Panic on Wall Street, (first published in 1968, TT Dutton, New York, 1988) 157 
46 Ibid, 158 
47 Dieter Ziegler, ‘The banking crisis of 1878: some remarks’, (1992) Economic History Review, XLV, 1, 137-
144, 143 
48 Supra note 2, (Collins) 520 
49 David Evans ‘Major and minor British banking crises since 1800’ in John Turner (ed), Banking in crisis: the 
rise and fall of British banking stability, 1800 to the present, (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 66-101, 86 
50 Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler ‘The evolution of shareholder voting rights: separation of 
ownership and consumption’, (2014). Faculty Scholarship Series. 4721, Yale Law Journal, 977  
51 Supra note 4, (BoE), 25  
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as well as lending to finance the acquisition of land companies in Australia and New Zealand and 
railways in the US.52   
 
At the time of its collapse, the bank had liabilities of £12.4m and assets of only £7.2m and the 
shareholders were required to make up the difference. All the depositors were repaid and the other 
Scottish banks honored all the fiat notes issued by the bank since some of the Scottish banks had note 
issue rights. By the time the assessment process was over only 254 of the 1,819 shareholders 
remained solvent. “Nearly 2,000 families suffered severe loss; many were ruined. In addition, another 
Scottish bank, the Caledonian, found itself a direct casualty of the unlimited liability rule.”53 The 
shareholders were largely concentrated in Glasgow and Edinburgh and the effects on the small 
communities seared the memory of the Scottish “central belt”.  
 
The penury into which City of Glasgow Bank shareholders had been thrown elicited a considerable 
amount of public sympathy. “A great majority of them, perhaps a thousand out of the twelve hundred 
and fifty, have been totally ruined by a catastrophe which they foresaw as little as they might have 
done an earthquake or a landslip. A large section of them are most respectable persons, in the decline 
of life, who have retired from trades or professions to live on their small realised properties, who 
cannot return to work again with any chance of success, and who have before them no prospect, 
except the poor-house or the grudging charities of relatives or friends. Hundreds have wives and 
children dependent on their incomes, and in all cases probably the ruin is that of households rather 
than of individuals.”54 The extensive press reporting “portrayed the shareholders as socially 
vulnerable and financially ruined investors, with small shareholdings. The public were reported as 
viewing the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank and the impact on its shareholders as a national 
tragedy.”55 The evidence of the bank’s directors’ incompetence led to the Glasgow Herald describing 
the directors’ “shipwreck of a noble institution; they have recklessly divided the plunder among 
themselves and their friends; and they have inflicted misery and ruin on thousands of innocent 
sufferers.” 56 “The Glasgow correspondent of the London Times wrote: “the parties chiefly concerned, 
and on whom the weight of the calamity will fall, are small merchants, divines and doctors of 
Medicine, none of whom can be classed among the wealthy and very many of whom had invested 
their savings of a lifetime”.57  The Times also reported that almost all the lawyers and accountants in 
Glasgow had kept clear of the bank;  “those best qualified to advise investors would have nothing to 
do with its shares” and it was the lesser well connected and knowledgeable who were caught as 
shareholders in the failed bank.58 Six directors and the General Manager went to prison for false 
accounting.59 
 
The newspapers may however have overstated the destitution caused by the bank’s failure and the call 
on shareholders. For example, on 5th November 1878 the Times described “the destitution and 
                                                          
52 Ibid 
53 Supra note 9, (Collins), 505. 
54 The Spectator, 2nd November 1878, Vol. 511, Issue 2627, 1363.  
55  Richard Button, Samuel Knott, Conor Macmanus and Matthew Willison, ‘Desperate adventurers and men of 
straw: the failure of City of Glasgow Bank and its enduring impact on the UK banking system’, (2015) Bank of 
England Quarterly bulletin, 27 
56 Forbes Munro, in the chapter, ’The failure of the City of Glasgow Bank, 1878–82’ in Maritime Enterprise and 
Empire, 1823-1893, (Boydell & Brewer, Boydell Press, Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2003), 254 
57 Leo Rosenblum, ‘The failure of the City of Glasgow Bank’, (Dec 1933), The Accounting Review, Vol. 8, No. 
4, 285-291, 290-291 
58 Ibid, (Rosenblum), 290-291 
59 Supra note 4, (BoE), 25 
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bereavement which this unfortunate calamity would entail and the list of shareholders embraced a 
terrible proportion of cases where the loss could mean nothing but absolute and hopeless beggary” 
and the Economist of 27th December 1879, stated that in “hundreds and thousands of cases homes 
have been broken up, health and life destroyed, dismay and ruin spread over towns and parishes, sons 
and daughters left penniless.”60 The newspapers, in effect, highlighted to their readers that without a 
rapid change to the shareholder liability law that it could be them next time a bank failed. 
  
The traumatic collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank (as one of the largest unlimited liability banks in 
the UK) in October 187861 shifted the mood against unlimited liability and led to the passage of the 
Companies Act of 187962.  This Act created the concept of reserve liability “which meant that banks 
could have extended liability, but less than unlimited liability; for example, some banks had double 
liability (i.e., for every £100 of capital shareholders had paid in, they were liable for another £100) 
and others had various multiples of paid-up capital.63 This reserve liability could be called up only in 
the event of a bank’s failing, unlike uncalled capital which also could be called up at the discretion of 
directors. All banks quickly limited their liability after the passage of the 1879 Act, but reserve 
liability - under which a shareholder was liable for a bank’s debt up to some multiple of its 
shareholding - remained a feature of British banking until the mid-1950s”64 which meant that banks 
could have extended liability but less than unlimited liability.65 Reserve liability was thus a capped or 
limited liability over and above paid-up capital owed by shareholders to the bank which could be 
called on to make good any deficit on the bank’s liquidation. 
The existence of unlimited lability may have restricted the size of banks since a large balance sheet 
increased the risk of large losses for shareholders and, consequently, discouraged investment in 
banking. Further, as was seen with the City of Glasgow Bank the link between shareholders and 
managers had ceased (principal/agency problem) and no-one, including depositors, appeared to have 
scrutinised the wealth or otherwise the list of shareholders.  The development of limited liability 
banks in the 1880s “removed these barriers to the emergence of larger banks, contributing to a wave 
of bank mergers in the late 19th and early 20th century.”66  This was coupled with a requirement for 
mandatory independent audits.67 
 
Another interesting historical precedent is provided by the of the Companies Act of 1948, sections 
202 and 212. According to Section 202 (which survived into the Companies Act 1985 as Section 
                                                          
60 Quoted in Thomas Lee,‘A helpless class of shareholder’: newspapers and the City of Glasgow Bank failure’, 
(2012) Accounting History Review,  Vol. 22, Issue 2, 143-159, 143, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21552851.2012.681125?src=recsys. (accessed 11th June 2018) 
61 Michael Collins, ‘The banking crisis of 1878’, (Nov., 1989), The Economic History Review 
Vol. 42, No. 4, 504-527, 504-505 
62 John Turner, Banking in crisis: the rise and fall of British banking stability, 1800 to the present, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). The Overend Gurney collapse in 1866, Guy Morton pointed out in correspondence, was 
of an institution which had got in a precarious situation as an unlimited partnership and was trying to bail itself 
out by raising new money (on a false prospectus). 
63 Willinson, supra note, at p. 10 notes that while Walter Bagehot was “against unlimited liability”, he “did 
favour shareholders having double or triple liability”. 
64 Turner, supra note, at p. 132. Willinson, supra, at note 5 and Section 3. 
65 Graeme Acheson, Charles Hickson and John Turner, ‘Does limited liability matter? Evidence from 
nineteenth-century British banking’, (2006) XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.508.7416&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(accessed 7th June 2018) 
66 Supra note 4, (BoE), 30 
67 The Companies Act 1879, (42 & 43 Vict c 76). The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
was founded in 1880 with its members providing these independent audits. 
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503), “in a limited company the liability of the directors or managers, or of the managing director, 
may, if so provided by the memorandum, be unlimited.”  Section 212, the enforcement provision, 
(which became section 503 of the 1985 Act, and, shortly after that, section 75 of the Insolvency Act 
1986) provided a free-standing mechanism for enforcing this liability: A director or manager with 
unlimited liability “shall, in addition to his liability (if any) to contribute as an ordinary member, be 
liable to make a further contribution as if he were at the commencement of the winding up a member 
of an unlimited company”.68  This Section was repealed from 1st October 2009 by the secondary 
legislation introducing the Companies Act 2006 (the Companies Act 2006 (Consequential 
Amendments, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2009 (S.I. 2009/1941), arts 2(1), 8 (Sch 1 
para 75(4)), which appears to confirm that the abolition must have been part of the 2006 reforms. 
 
This historical precedent constitutes a working example of a structural incentive which avoided one of 
the main drawbacks of unlimited liability, namely that it is very imperfectly targeted.  It was probably 
dropped by the Company Law Review on the ground that it was never used.  As Guy Morton notes, if 
so, that does not necessarily prove that it was a bad idea - merely that it was unattractive to a group of 
people - prospective managers - who exercised a dominant influence over the structure chosen for 
institutions.  In fairness to those people, though, the unlimited liability of managers had the additional 
drawback of being “all or nothing” and of containing no mechanism for tempering liability by 
reference to culpability, so they can hardly be blamed for shying away from it.69 
There is at least one surviving UK bank with unlimited liability - C Hoare & Co. - which is an 
unlimited company and the shareholders are also the managers.70 C Hoare & Co. prides itself in 
having a conservative and personal ethos and in encouraging a long term outlook for their customer 
relationships and business decisions, one that tries not maximize profits, but to optimize quality. Their 
purpose is “to be good bankers and good citizens”.71   
 
The knowledge of unlimited liability prompts partners to be cautious about the criteria and process for 
admission to partnership (this is still how many law firms structure themselves), and to aim for dual or 
multiple oversight of very large and complex matters.72 But in this context also unlimited liability can 
have very harsh effects, particularly in cases of partner fraud. (The example of Sir Walter Scott, who 
spent the latter part of his life writing to pay off creditors of a firm of which he had been a sleeping 
partner, provides a cautionary note.) 
 
                                                          
68 Thanks to Guy Morton for observations on this point. 
69 Thanks to Guy Morton for observations on this point 
70 C. Hoare & Co is the oldest bank in the UK and maintains close family ownership of the firm since the 17th 
Century. Five of the board directors are members of the same founding family. They and two other family 
members, are the only shareholders. They are known as “partners” and each has unlimited liability. 
https://www.hoaresbank.co.uk/sites/default/files/styles/CHC%20Cons%20Accounts%202018_Signed.pdf 
The bank is very small operating in a niche very high-net-worth market and conservatively run, in terms of 
capital, liquidity and lending practices. It has only 371 employees with two branches (as of 31 March 2018). The 
bank’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of over 21% is significantly higher than the average of the large UK banks 
(which are structured as PLCs). The bank keeps a significant part of its assets at the Bank of England (£1.2 Bn, 
just over 25% of all its assets). Almost all the other assets consist of loans to customers (£3.3 Bn).. 
71 We thank Alexander Hoare, CEO of C Hoare and Co,  for observations on this point. 
72 The extent to which  the abandonment of the traditional partnership structure by the major US investment 
banks (the last to become incorporated as a public company being Goldman Sachs in 1999) contributed to 
shifting industry expectations as regards levels of remuneration and risk-taking is a subject which deserves 
further study. 
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As the City of Glasgow Bank demise illustrated, unlimited liability for shareholders fell into disrepute 
because it failed to address the agency problem and thus punished the innocent without deterring or 
punishing the guilty.  It is however an effective driver of behaviour in a partnership because here the 
agency problem either does not exist or is tightly controlled - in an unlimited partnership, the 
individuals who effectively direct the business are also among the principal individuals who will 
suffer in the event of failure.  But once a business moves from being a true partnership to being a 
company where ownership and management are in separate hands, the effectiveness of unlimited 
liability as a deterrent is reduced and the scope for creating injustice and hardship increases.  
 
The scope of our proposal of partial shareholder liability is limited to directors/managers.73 We are 
aware that with an ordinary share structure, unlimited liability could exacerbate the serious “agency” 
problem which already exists. In general shareholders’ ability to control management’s activities is 
quite limited, given the vast difference of knowledge between the two.  The experience of the Lloyd’s 
insurance market in the late 1980s and 1990s is a cautionary example: many unlimited liability Names 
were ruined, while their agents suffered no more than loss of income.   
 
II. 3 A brief assessment of the Canadian experience of shareholder double liability 
 
“Double liability was an inherent part of the Canadian banking system almost right from its 
creation”.74 Under the double liability rule in Canada, in the case of bank failure, bank shareholders 
were responsible for twice the amount of their subscribed shares, that is for the amount of their 
subscribed shares and for an additional amount not larger than the par value of their shares. “Facing 
higher possible losses, bank shareholders are likely to become more risk averse under the double 
liability rule, as compared to the single liability assessment leading to lower risk taking”.75  Between 
1868 and 1881 double liability assessments were successful levied on the shareholders of two of the 
eight banks that failed; between 1883 and 1899 there were “nine bank failures and double liability 
was enforced in four cases; and in the period 1905-1923, there were nine bank failures and double 
liability was collected in eight cases.” Across all these periods, the successful collection rate of the 
double liability averaged 59% of the paid-up capital compared with 49% in the US.76   
 
Canadian shareholder double liability was phased out between 1934-1950. This led to an increase in 
bank leverage “…mainly due to their shift towards investment in liquid government securities”. The 
enhanced regulation and supervision of chartered banks “created entry barriers for potential new 
competitors. That led to the development of oligopoly in the Canadian banking market”.77 Michael 
                                                          
73 Unlimited liability in relation to banks presents a further challenge: that in the circumstances of a modern 
bank it is too powerful an incentive and that is why we propose a system of intermediate liability.  The reality of 
modern banking is that since the affairs of a modern bank are too complex, there might be little incentive for a 
prudent person to assume the responsibilities of management at all if that entails strict liability for the 
consequences of failure. Liability may also be tempered by the traditional ‘has acted honestly and reasonably 
and ought to be excused’ power of exoneration for misfeasance liability. Thanks to Guy Morton for observations 
on this point. 
74Anna Grodecka and Antonis Kotidis, ‘Double liability in a branch banking system: historical evidence from 
Canada’, (2016), Working Paper Series 316, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden), 4 
75 Ibid. 2 
76 Ibid, 4 
77 Ibid, 30 
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Bordo describes this as a “grand bargain whereby the chartered banks would provide financial 
stability in exchange for the Canadian government limiting entry to the industry.”78 
 
II. 4.  Brief reference to other jurisdictions 
Under Swiss law, most banks are organised as sociétés anonymes.79 Swiss law has a very strict notion 
of sociétés anonymes (Aktiengeslleschaften). Art. 680(1) of the Code of obligations states: “A 
shareholder may not be required, even under the articles of association, to contribute more than the 
amount fixed for subscription of a share on issue”. Until relatively recently, there were Swiss private 
bankers, ie natural persons exercising the banking business (generally restricted to investment 
services) in some form of partnership. Such bankers were liable with all their personal assets for any 
liability of the bank. There would also be limited partners (commanditaire) whose liability was 
limited to the amount of their commandite.  
In civil law jurisdictions, the corporate form of the société en comandite in France or Sociedad en 
comandita (Sociedad comanditaria) in Spain or Kommanditgesellschaft in Germany permits limited 
partnership business entities in which partners with unlimited liability coexist with partners whose 
liability is limited to their fixed contributions to the partnership. These provide further examples of 
the possibility of establishing different categories of financial liability that coexist together under the 
same corporate structure.  
Coming back to Switzerland, private bankers such as Pictet, Lombard et Mirabaud, retained that legal 
structure for their Swiss operation until 2014, when they transformed it into sociétés anonyme. (All 
other entities in their group were already companies limited by shares). They retain an element of 
partnership at the holding level, where they are protected by the limited liability of their many 
operational subsidiaries, including the flagship Swiss bank.80  
The idea of financial liability ‘with teeth’ (intermediate liability) attached to senior bank managers  
provides an innovative solution that not only enhances individual accountability (correct bank 
incentives) but also contributes to financial stability, considered in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis as a public good.81  
Though the EC Twelfth Council Company Law Directive82 of 1989 requires Member States to make 
available legal structures for individuals to trade with limited liability (this was implemented in 
England and Wales by the Statutory Instruments 1992/1699), the EU provides an interesting example 
of the increasing differential corporate and regulatory treatment of banks as compared to other 
companies. Regulation has expanded exponentially in the banking sector over the last two decades in 
the EU (and beyond). Furthermore, special rules in competition and state aid point to the continuous 
                                                          
78 Michael Bordo, Angela Redish, and Hugh Rockoff,  ‘Why didn't Canada have a banking crisis in 2008 (or in 
1930, or 1907, or ...)?’, (2011) NBER Working Paper No. 17312, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17312  
79 A number of them distribute shares or share options to their directors and some top employees, or allow them 
to buy shares at a discounted price. However, these shares do not include some potential liability for these 
special shareholders. The way it is now done is a contract (and some form of escrow where necessary) which 
allows the company to claw back the shares (or cancel the options) in case of certain defined events happen. 
Thanks to Luc Thevenoz for information on points of Swiss law.  
80 Thanks to Luc Thévenoz for information on points of Swiss law. 
81 There are of course a number of design issues which require further research. For example for liability to stick 
to the right person, it would require a prohibition to sell the shares for a given period of time. Perhaps the same 
result might be achieved by way of a contract with the manager to whom (ordinary) shares or options are issued. 
If we want the liability to be potentially greater than the value of the shares, a contract could also achieve that. 
82 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:31989L0667  
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specialty of banking and emphasize the need to design an adequate system of incentives that 
minimizes excessive bank risk taking to the detriment of society. 
 
III.  Alternative Proposals  
 
There is a vast literature on potential improvements/changes to the business structure and governance 
of public corporations in general, and of commercial banks in particular. Rather than attempting to 
wade through all of this, in this Section we focus on the three recent sets of proposals in this field by 
Conti-Brown, Schwarcz and Kokkinis.83 
 
III.1 Elective Shareholder Liability 
Conti Brown84 proposes to solve the problem of bailouts by means of a legal mechanism he calls 
‘elective shareholder liability’ which he claims is less intrusive and more effective than the regulatory 
solutions of Dodd-Frank. 
Elective shareholder liability gives shareholders of systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) the choice between reducing the firm’s leverage by increasing capital significantly or by 
creating a bailout exception to the SIFI’s limited liability status, such that the government can recoup 
the losses associated with any taxpayer bailout from the SIFI shareholders directly. By having 
shareholders instead of taxpayers cover the ultimate costs of the bank’s failure, the incentive structure 
gets radically altered.   
Elective shareholder liability could be structured as a governmental collection, similar to a tax 
assessment, for the recoupment of all bailout costs against the shareholders on a pro rata basis. The 
proposed structure would also give the government the authority to declare the shareholders’ use of 
the corporate form to evade liability null and void, and would require that shareholders who litigate 
against collection and subsequently lose pay treble damages, including the government's litigation 
costs. Elective shareholder liability anticipates the development of a derivatives market that would 
insure shareholders against liability, the price of which would contain more relevant information 
about risk concentration than is presently available in the capital markets.  
Conti-Brown points out the ex ante and ex post benefits of elective shareholder liability. Ex ante, it 
requires directors and officers who are significant shareholders to increase self-monitoring. Ex post, it 
creates a fund that can be used to reimburse taxpayers at least partially for the costs of bailouts.  
Elective shareholder liability draws on the partnership structure of investment banking that dominated 
the field throughout its history, until the late twentieth century. That structure provided for unlimited 
personal liability in the event of bank failure. Though the complexity and size of modem investment 
banks make a simple return to partnerships unlikely, elective shareholder can accomplish some of the 
same goals. 
Conti Brown’s proposal focuses on placing extra liability on those who have the information and 
power to make the decisions for good or ill.  However, by imposing elective shareholders’ liability on 
                                                          
83 Though others have written about this, given our ongoing dialogue with Peter Conti Brown and Steven 
Schwarcz we considered it pertinent to refer to their proposals. As for Kokkinis’ book, it is a lucid explanation 
of the problems, which complements our own, though we go further than Kokkinis in terms of suggesting 
solutions to the problems at stake. 
84 See Peter Conti Brown, “Elective Shareholder Liability” 64 Stan. L. Rev. 409 2012 
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every shareholder in large banks, this solution may run into exactly the same problem as hit double 
liability in the US in the 1930s, i.e. having to chase up and extract money from many small 
shareholders, and/or make the return to capital significantly lower on large SIFI banks than on any 
other public company.  Unless one thinks, perhaps for other reasons, that a differential penalty on 
really big banks is a good idea in any case, then we believe his proposal is less focussed and less 
efficient than our own. Our proposal also allows us to impose sanctions on other bodies with 
information and power to control companies, which are not shareholders, such as accountancy (audit) 
firms and Credit Rating Agencies.85 
 
III.2 Public governance duty 
Steven Schwarcz argues that limited liability should be redesigned to better align investor and social 
interests for shadow-banking firms and advocates a public governance duty.86  
 
The thrust of his public governance duty proposal is as follows: Market failures encouraging 
excessive SIFI risk-taking stem from the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance. 
Therefore, the most direct way of correcting those failures (and controlling excessive risk-taking) 
would be to modify that model by imposing some type of a public governance duty that requires SIFI 
managers to also consider the public consequences of their firm’s actions. 
Proposing such a duty would engage the longstanding debate whether corporate governance law 
should require a duty to the public. The accepted wisdom is not to require such a duty because 
corporate profit maximization provides jobs and other public benefits that exceed any harm. The 
assumption underlying that wisdom is that any significant public harm would be prohibited by other 
law or internalized through tort law. That assumption fails, however, for systemic public harm.      
Schwarcz examines the merits and design, as well as the possible costs and benefits, of imposing a 
public governance duty.87 Such a duty could be performed, for example, by a SIFI’s risk committee, 
including risk committees mandated by post-crisis financial regulation. Most such risk committees, 
however, are not yet required to consider systemic risk or public harm. For example, risk committees 
required under the Dodd-Frank Act are only mandated to focus on risks to the SIFI itself, not to the 
                                                          
85A. Admati, P. Conti-Brown and Paul Pfleiderer, ‘Liability Holding Companies’, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 852 (2012). 
further consider changes to the governance of financial institutions in order to decrease the likelihood of 
taxpayers’ bail-outs the US context. They propose an increased-liability version of the bank’s equity via the 
introduction of a new kind of financial institution: liability holding company (LHC) which would be subject to a 
unique regulatory regime supervised by the Federal Reserve. 
86See S. Schwarcz, “Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty,” 92 Notre Dame Law Review 1 
(Nov. 2016); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644375 and “Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, 
and Corporate Responsibility,” 102 Minnesota Law Review 761 (2017) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847026 . 
See also Schwarcz, “Systematic Regulation of Systemic Risk”, forthcoming in  Wisconsin Law Review, Volume 
2019, Issue No. 1, currently available at  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233666) 
87 The  proposed realignment of private and public interests under a public governance duty is different from the 
regulatory responses to the financial crisis that attempt to mitigate excessive risk-taking by aligning managerial 
and investor interests. Requiring managers of systemically important firms to account for systemic externalities 
in their governance decisions would help to correct this misalignment between private and public interests. That, 
in turn, would help to reduce excessive risk-taking. Managers of systemically important firms should have a 
duty to society (a “public governance duty”) not to engage their firms in excessive risk-taking that leads to 
systemic externalities. See Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 
102 Minnesota Law Review 761 (2017), pp 787-792. 
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public. Even the guidelines of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision merely require SIFI 
managers to “look after the interests of the bank as a whole” and do not require them to take into 
account the possibility of systemic externalities. 
The thrust of Schwarcz’s proposals on how limited liability should be redesigned to better align 
investor and social interests for shadow-banking firms88 is as follows: Limited liability is not always 
optimal for firms that make up the shadow banking system. It motivates investor-managers of those 
firms to take risks that could generate outsized personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic 
risk. The law does not effectively mitigate these systemic externalities. Tort law, for example, 
traditionally helps to mitigate non-systemic externalities resulting from limited liability by 
empowering injured third parties to whom the torteasor owes a duty of care to sue for harm that is a 
causal and foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor’s actions. Systemic harm, however, affects a 
wide range of third parties in unpredictable ways; it is neither directly causal nor clearly foreseeable. 
To mitigate systemic externalities, Schwarcz argues that limited liability should be redesigned for 
investor-managers of shadow banking firms. Any such redesign must balance the need to increase 
liability sufficiently to reduce systemic risk with not discouraging investment. The redesign should 
also minimize costs by discouraging the need to engage in cross-investor monitoring. These 
competing goals may well be achievable by restricting the increased liability to a capped multiple of 
the original investment, such as double liability. 
Regardless of how limited liability is redesigned, Schwarcz says that it faces the dilemma that 
investor-managers would have relatively little incentive to monitor and guard against their firm’s 
potential to trigger systemic risk if, as indicated, tort law bars injured parties from recovering 
damages. According to Schwarcz, a possible solution to this dilemma would be to couple the 
redesigned limited liability with a privatized systemic risk fund—which would be used to mitigate 
systemic harm—into which systemically risky shadow banking firms would be required to contribute. 
If an investor-manager’s firm had insufficient capital to make these contributions, the investor-
managers would become personally liable for at least a portion of the insufficiency, thereby 
motivating them to monitor and help control their firm’s systemically risky behavior. 
An ultimate question for any redesign of limited liability is empirical: will its benefits exceed its 
costs? The answer to that question will depend according to Schwarcz on the actual mechanics of the 
redesign, and their real-world impact on risk-taking and investment.  
Schwarcz also suggests structuring mid-level executive incentive schemes to include more drastic 
deferral and malus elements which tie remuneration more effectively to long term outcomes.89 
Secondary-management conflicts are an intra-firm principal-agent failure. It arises because secondary 
managers are almost always paid under short-term compensation schemes, misaligning their interests 
with the long-term interests of the firm. Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing 
information asymmetry between those managers, who often are technically sophisticated, and the 
senior managers to whom they report.  Prior to the financial crisis, for example, financial firms began 
compensating secondary managers not only for generating profits but also for generating profits with 
low risks, as measured by the VaR, or value-at-risk, model for measuring investment-portfolio risk. 
Secondary managers turned to investment products with low VaR risk profile, like credit default 
swaps that generate small gains but only rarely have losses. They knew, but did not always explain to 
                                                          
88 Schwarcz,“The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited 
Liability,” 90 Notre Dame Law Review 1 (2014); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364126. 
89 Schwarcz, “Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs,” 26 
Yale J. on Reg. 457 (2009); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1322536.  
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their superiors, that any losses that might eventually occur would be huge. The resulting losses 
ultimately jeopardized the solvency of numerous major financial institutions. 
According to Schwarcz, regulation should require SIFIs to mitigate these conflicts by paying 
secondary managers under longer-term compensation schemes—e.g., compensation subject to 
clawbacks or deferred compensation based on long-term results. In practice, however, that solution 
would confront a collective action problem: firms that offer their secondary managers longer-term 
compensation might be unable to hire as competitively as firms that offer more immediate 
compensation. Because good secondary managers can work in financial centers worldwide, regulation 
may also be needed to help solve this collective action problem not only within, but also across, 
nations. 
Schwarcz also examines behavioral limitations on the effectiveness of macroprudential financial 
regulation90, questions why bank executives were not held personally liable for the GFC,91 and argues 
that that regulation cannot prevent systemic collapses, so macroprudential regulation should be 
designed to also mitigate the impact of such (inevitable) collapses.92   
Moreover Schwarcz’ proposals would still seem to run counter to Milton Friedman’s arguments as set 
out in his New York Times Magazine (September 13, 1970) where he explains why in his view the 
social responsibility of corporate executives is to increase profits.93 
                                                          
90 Schwarcz, “Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations and Legal Efficacy,” 93 Notre Dame Law Review 
1073 (2018), also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2875030.  
91 Schwarcz, “Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of Personal Blame,” 65 Emory Law Journal 
533 (2015), also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2553511. 
92 Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure” (with Iman 
Anabtawi), 92 Texas Law Review 75 (2013); also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271587. 
93https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/article-15-no-title.html  “What does it mean to say that the 
corporate executive has a "social responsibility" in his capacity as businessman? If this statement is not pure 
rhetoric, it must mean that he is to act in some way that is not in the interest of his employers. For example, that 
he is to refrain from increasing the price of the product in order to contribute to the social objective of 
preventing inflation, even though a price increase would be in the best interests of the corporation. Or that he is 
to make expenditures on reducing pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the corporation or 
that is required by law in order to contribute to the social objective of improving the environment. Or that, at the 
expense of corporate profits, he is to hire "hardcore" unemployed instead of better qualified available workmen 
to contribute to the social objective of reducing poverty.   
In each of these cases, the corporate executive would be spending someone else's money for a general social 
interest. Insofar as his actions in accord with his "social responsibility" reduce returns to stockholders, he is 
spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to customers, he is spending the customers' money. 
Insofar as his actions lower the wages of some employees, he is spending their money.   
The stockholders or the customers or the employees could separately spend their own money on the particular 
action if they wished to do so. The executive is exercising a distinct "social responsibility," rather than serving 
as an agent of the stockholders or the customers or the employees, only if he spends the money in a different 
way than they would have spent it.  But if he does this, he is in effect imposing taxes, on the one hand, and 
deciding how the tax proceeds shall be spent, on the other.   
This process raises political questions on two levels: principle and consequences. On the level of political 
principle, the imposition of taxes and the expenditure of tax proceeds are governmental functions. We have 
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We shall explain in the following Section why this (Friedmanian) critique does not apply to our 
proposal. 
III.3 Kokkinis  
In a recent book on “Corporate Law and Financial Stability” 94 Kokkinis exposes the misalignment 
between the conventional UK corporate law framework and the pursuit of the objective of financial 
stability. In particular, he criticises the features of limited liability, separate corporate personality and 
shareholder profit maximisation associated with the plc societal form, since they create incentives for 
excessive bank risk-taking. The analytical framework, drawing on the classic separation between 
ownership and control, whereby shareholders are the principals and managers the agents, pits the 
private interests of bank managers and shareholders against the public interest in financial stability.  
Kokkinis suggests the imposition of additional duties on managers through tougher legal requirements 
and proposes a mechanism for opening up directors and senior management to civil suit in the case of 
failure.  
Overall, the review of accountability mechanisms establishes that financial institution directors and 
senior managers who follow profit maximisation strategies entailing excessive risk-taking, but are in 
good faith, are still unlikely to face personal liability despite the reinforced powers of regulators to 
impose sanctions on individuals and the introduction of criminal liability for taking a risky decision 
that causes the failure of a financial institution.95  
Kokkinis advocates the introduction of a new statutory provision to hold senior managers personally 
liable in case an institution fails. Such liability, he claims, should be limited to the total renumeration 
received during the five years preceding the failure.  
In our proposals, outlined below, we go further than Kokkinis. 
 
                                                          
established elaborate constitutional, parliamentary and judicial provisions to control these functions, to assure 
that taxes are imposed so far as possible in accordance with the preferences and desires of the public--after all, 
"taxation without representation" was one of the battle cries of the American Revolution. We have a system of 
checks and balances to separate the legislative function of imposing taxes and enacting expenditures from the 
executive function of collecting taxes and administering expenditure programs and from the judicial function of 
mediating disputes and interpreting the law.   
Here the businessman--self-selected or appointed directly or indirectly by stockholders--is to be simultaneously 
legislator, executive and jurist. He is to decide whom to tax by how much and for what purpose, and he is to 
spend the proceeds--all this guided only by general exhortations from on high to restrain inflation, improve the 
environment, fight poverty and so on and on.   
The whole justification for permitting the corporate executive to be selected by the stockholders is that the 
executive is an agent serving the interests of his principal. This justification disappears when the corporate 
executive imposes taxes and spends the proceeds for "social" purposes. He becomes in effect a public employee, 
a civil servant, even though he remains in name an employee of a private enterprise.”  
94 Andreas Kokkinis, ‘Corporate Law and Financial Instability’, (London, UK: Routledge), (2018). 
95 Ibid. p. 137. 
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IV. Calibration 
Our basic proposal is that there should be two separate categories of equity investors for PLCs, 
‘outside’ investors who maintain limited liability, as now, and ‘insiders’,  who should have varying 
degrees of further liability, as outlined below.  But how do you distinguish between these two 
categories?  In principle, the distinction is straightforward.  ‘Insiders’ have access to significantly 
greater information about the working of the enterprise than ‘outsiders’, and the potential to use that 
information to prevent excessively risky actions.  In practice, of course, the distinction is not so easy 
to make.  ‘Insiders’ would include all of the Board of Directors, including the externals.  For 
employees, we would suggest a two-fold categorisation, by status within the company, and by scale of 
remuneration.  Thus any employee on the Executive Board, or who was Chief of a Division would be 
included.  But the key players in a company are frequently indicated by the scale of their 
remuneration rather than by their formal position.  So any employee who was earning a salary in 
excess of, say, 50% of that of the CEO, would also be assessed as an ‘Insider’.  Nevertheless, if the 
potential sanction of multiple liability arising from failure was regarded as severe, there could be 
attempts to adjust titles and salaries so as to avoid being categorised as an ‘Insider’.  So, the 
regulatory authority should have the right to designate anyone in a particular company as being an 
‘insider’, subject to judicial review.  The PRA/FCA under the SM&CR already requires banks to 
ensure that all the designated responsibilities are allocated, that these are set out in a “responsibilities 
map” and that the bank board signs off on this, ensuring no over or underlaps and the appropriateness 
of the allocations. 
Large shareholders are also in a position to access inside information, and to exert influence on the 
course that a company might follow.  So any shareholder with a holding greater than, say, 5% of the 
company, should also be regarded as an ‘insider’.  There is no particular key threshold, above which a 
large shareholder should be regarded as an ‘insider’.  In particular institutional shareholders vary in 
the degree to which they prefer to be active, or passive.  It is arguable that one should give 
shareholders, notably institutional investors, holding between 2 and 5% of the value of the shares the 
ability to choose whether to count as an ‘outsider’, or as an ‘insider’.96  If they want to count as an 
‘outsider’, they would have to undertake not to exercise voting rights, and not to participate in policy 
discussions, e.g. at AGMs.  They should be allowed to change their preferred designation, but only 
after a period of notice, say six months.   
The base to which the liability should apply would be the remuneration of all those counted as 
‘insiders’, (dividends in the case of large inside shareholders), cumulated from the date that they took 
on that role.  This would apply to all forms of remuneration, except those provided in the form of bail-
inable debt, with all subsequent transactions in such debt having to be notified.  This would apply to 
the directors and employees.     
Not all ‘insiders’ are equal.  In particular, the CEO has much more information and power than any of 
his subordinates, other members of the Board, or the auditors.  One might think that the CEO’s 
liability could be three times the accumulated relevant value of remuneration (ex bail-inables) from 
the time that he or she had taken up the role of CEO.  Board members and chief officers of the 
company might have two-times liability, and every other ‘insider’ employee a single liability equal to 
their accumulated revenue.  Similarly, large shareholders with greater than 5% holdings might have 
double liability, i.e. for an additional twice par value of their shares, while ‘insider’ shareholders, 
                                                          
96 In his comments to our paper, Rafael Repullo pointed out the challenges that the growing importance of 
passive institutional investors presents for our proposal. 
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between 2 and 5%, might be liable to pay in an additional par value of their shares, as in the American 
National Bank system before the 1930s.     
That raises two further questions.  The first is what should happen when an ‘insider’ ceases to play 
that role, e.g. an employee leaves the company, or a large shareholder sells their shares.  The second is 
that an ‘insider’ may be aware that the company is entering dangerous territory, but cannot persuade 
management to change direction.  In that case, how could they avoid being sanctioned for a policy 
that they would not themselves advocate?   
In the first case, of departure from the role of ‘insider’, it would seem appropriate to taper the liability 
according to the degree of ‘insider’ knowledge and power.  Thus, if it was agreed that the CEO should 
have a three times extra liability, then that liability would decline at a constant rate over the following 
three years, leaving the CEO with zero further liability exactly three years after they had left.  By the 
same token, those with a two times additional liability, should have it taper at a constant rate until 
they were free of any further liability after two years; and so on for those with a one-time additional 
liability.   
Then we come to the second issue, which is the question of how those with additional liability can 
avoid sanction in those cases where they have opposed the policy, but have failed to succeed in 
changing it.  Our suggestion in this case is that those in such a position should address a formal, but 
confidential and private, letter to the relevant regulators, setting out their concerns about the policy 
being followed.  The regulator would have to formally acknowledge receipt of such letters, and they 
could then be used in mitigation, or often abandonment of any sanction, should the company then fail.  
Moreover, in the event of the company failing, for the reasons indicated in such a letter(s), this would 
in turn act as a form of accountability for the regulators.  All such letters would have to be made 
publicly available in the event of failure.  It would be a legal offence for the regulator then not to 
publish any such letter.   
There is a more difficult question, whether the regulator, having received such a private confidential 
letter of warning, perhaps from the auditor, or an unhappy employee, should make them public.  In 
our view, such warnings need to be investigated further by an independent body, such as the regulator 
or a financial ombudsman before being made publicly available, since in many cases, they may well 
be groundless with the maintained policy of the company being appropriate.  But if the regulator, after 
investigation, should feel that the warnings had merit, the first step would then be to have a private 
discussion with management on the merits of the case, and, if management remained unmoved, the 
next stage would be to publish the warning (anonymously) together with the regulator’s own 
assessment, at the same time offering management the opportunity to state publicly their own side of 
the case.  When the latter process had been completed, ‘outsiders’ would then be as well informed as 
‘insiders’ on the merits of the issue.   
Note that it puts regulators in the firing line for at least severe reputational damage, if they receive 
such warnings, fail to act upon them, and the warnings prove prescient.   
The purpose of the exercise is to provide appropriate sanctions for failure on those with ‘insider’ 
knowledge and power.  The particular illustrative numbers chosen in the above section are, obviously, 
somewhat arbitrary.  But the exercise can be calibrated to impose appropriate sanctions for all such 
‘insiders’, whether large shareholders, key employees, or regulators.  We think that this would be a 
better form of governance. 
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This approach does not, we believe, leave us open to the Friedman criticism that it completely severs 
the interests and incentives of the agent (the manager) from that of the principal (the equity holder). 
The remuneration of both remained totally aligned under our proposal, so long as the company is 
profitable. It is only in instances of bad outcomes, especially bankruptcies, that the sanction on the 
managers/insiders becomes more severe than that on the outside equity holders. The aim is to reduce 
the risk of such bad outcomes being shifted to others, e.g. employees, creditors, taxpayers and, via 
various externalities, to the economy more widely. 
While we would hope, and indeed expect, that greater pecuniary sanctions on inside equity holders, 
notably managers and CEOs, would significantly reduce excessive risk-taking and bankruptcy, history 
clearly reveals that unlimited liability did not prevent large scale and systemic occasions of failures. 
There were major incidences of bank failures, primarily among unlimited liability country banks, in 
1825, 1837 and 1847,97 and, of course, it was the failure of the City of Glasgow bank in 1878 with a 
widespread holding of outsider-type unlimited shareholdings that led to a general transition of banks 
from unlimited to limited liability.  Irrespective of the sanctions involved, most humans are unduly 
optimistic about their own skills and ability, (it is generally believed that some 90% of car drivers 
believe they are in the top 50% of driving ability).  Moreover, systemic failures frequently arise as a 
result of a general incapacity to assess risk correctly.   
Thus it is, perhaps, more common for failure to arise as a result of an invalid appreciation of 
probabilities, rather than a conscious assumption of additional perceived risk. This, in turn, means that 
in many cases that there was no intention, mens rea, to put the company, the bank, into a position of 
excessive risk. Dick Fuld did not think that building up a massive holding of mortgage-backed 
securities was risky, nor did Fred Goodwin appreciate the risks involved in the ABN-Amro merger.  
But if in many, perhaps most, cases there was no conscious intention to risk the bank or any moral 
blame, in the sense of knowingly taking on an exposed position, then there can be no effective basis 
for a legal sanction. In that sense, the pecuniary sanction that we are proposing is not itself based on 
any moral, or indeed legal, basis. But note that corporate failures also impact adversely on many 
stakeholders who are clearly and certainly blameless. What really upset people in the aftermath of the 
Great Financial Crisis was that many innocent bystanders, homeowners who had their homes 
respossessed, bank employees, taxpayers, etc., were often seriously damaged, whereas the leading 
bankers appeared to walk away with their accumulated wealth and forthcoming pension rights entirely 
unaffected. This was perceived as extremely unfair.  One of the main purposes of our proposal is to 
restore a sense of balance, and fairness, between the sanctions imposed on bankers, as compared with 
those imposed on other stakeholders; and such a sense of balance needs to be, in some large part, 
independent of the intentions of the corporate (bank) managers, which intentions in any case would be 
extremely hard to discern in a court of law.  
There might, just possibly, be room for an extension of our proposal. In recent decades, regulatory 
bodies (as well as the Department of Justice in the USA) have taken to the practice of imposing large 
fines on corporates when corporate activity is perceived as having been wrongful, for example, the 
Deepwater disaster for BP, and fines for allowing money laundering and evading sanctions on banks. 
But such fines primarily fall on outside shareholders, who had no involvement whatsoever in the 
actions undertaken, and the fines deplete the capital buffers of corporates, often just at the time when 
they are most needed.  What would be desirable, if it could be done, would be to redirect such fines 
                                                          
97  Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England: A History, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), (1970).  
See Volume II, Chapters II, III and IV. 
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solely to the segment of inside shareholders, as defined above. It is those who have control over 
decisions, not the generality of outside shareholders, who should be fined for wrongful activities. 
There have been some moves in the general direction that this paper proposes. In particular the 
adoption of the Senior Management and Certification Regime (SM&CR) in the UK is a step in the 
right direction. The SM&CR, introduced in the UK in December 2013, had several aims. It was seen 
by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, as a device that could pierce through what 
its report repeatedly referred to as an accountability firewall that had hitherto made it hard for senior 
managers to be held responsible for their failings. Parliament wanted a completely new regime that 
would ensure “senior managers of banks [would] no longer be able to hide behind an accountability 
firewall, where they are too distant from the consequences of their responsibilities to be held directly 
accountable when things go wrong.”98 To regulators, the SM&CR was seen as a framework that 
would enhance accountability at the highest level of regulated firms, targeting individuals – as 
opposed to institutions – and also enable more effective enforcement action. Fundamentally, however, 
in view of the thesis advanced in this paper, the SM&CR presents an opportunity to “internalise” the 
costs of misconduct so that these costs fall on the very individuals involved in reckless behaviour or 
excessive risk taking, rather than on innocent bystanders (creditors, customer who lose their money, 
and taxpayers). Furthermore, the SM&CR could have potential as a deterrent against “externalising” 
the costs of misconduct to shareholders (where failure results in hefty penalties on the firm) or to 
taxpayers (when misconduct results in failure that imposes costs on taxpayers). 
However, the jury is still out on how effective the SM&CR has been. This can be explained by a 
number of factors. First, while the SM&CR legislation was enacted in December 2013, the framework 
only initially started in March 2016, and in 2017 it was extended to all financial firms in the UK, a 
process that has been going on through 2017/18, and has now drifted to the end of 2019. One could 
rightly argue that there has not been sufficient time to test SM&CR’s efficacy through enforcement 
and judicial actions, other than few cases such as the whistle blowing case involving the Barclay Bank 
chief executive.99 Second, the framework that is being rolled out today is slightly different in a few 
but important areas, compared to what the PCBS had recommended in 2013. Notably, the shift from a 
situation where a senior manager could have been forced to defend against regulatory action by 
evidencing the actions he or she took to prevent failure, to the current situation where the onus is on 
regulators, may have partly contributed to the limited enforcement action due to the time it takes to 
undertake investigations needed to support successful sanctions.  Be that as it may, the Press has been 
full of comments at end 2018 about how low has been the application of fines and other sanctions.  
Therefore, our contention is that the SMR does not go nearly far enough. It is a start; but our proposal 
would represent a major extension of the concept that penalties for failure should fall primarily on 
those with a controlling voice in the corporate decisions taken.  
There is also the issue faced by the PRA and FCA of attempting to impose sanctions on senior 
management based outside the UK.  This issue arises due to the way many banking groups operate 
with key functions and individuals based in other jurisdictions.  The legal structure of the bank and its 
actual operational organisation rarely coincide. 
If the pecuniary sanctions imposed on insiders are severe, and the suggestion that CEOs might be 
made to face unlimited liability would no doubt be seen as severe, then there would surely be attempts 
                                                          
98 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS), Changing banking for good (HC 175-II, 2013) 
489. 
99 Financial Conduct Authority, Final Notice 11 May 2018, (reference JXS02208) para 2.9. 
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to avoid or evade such sanctions. One of the claims that would be made is that this would significantly 
reduce the supply of qualified people prepared to take on senior management positions. We very 
much doubt whether this particular claim has much merit. It is hard to show that during earlier periods 
when the norm was unlimited liability, there was a shortage of candidates for a senior bank and 
corporate position. Moreover, the attractions of power, prestige and wealth that attend being a senior 
manager, in particular a CEO of a major company, will always attract many candidates. Indeed, one 
might even consider the possibility that an appreciation that failure could lead to penury might even 
lead to a better class of candidate being prepared to assume corporate leadership.  
But there would also be other avoidance measures undertaken, or at least threatened. One such would 
be to shift the country of incorporation to one where limited liability for all would still remain. That 
could be prevented, or at least offset, by requiring any organisation with a large-scale operation in the 
UK to do so in the form of a separately capitalised subsidiary, where the managers of that subsidiary 
would, in turn, be subject to multiple liability. A second possibility would be to try to avoid such 
sanctions by taking out insurance, for example, in the form of an extended version of the present 
Directors and Officers insurance. But we are not particularly concerned about that possibility. It 
would, for example, be impossible to insure a condition of unlimited liability, and the prospect of 
multiple liability would lead to the premia needing to be paid for such insurance to become extremely 
high, and, in turn, would lead the insurance company involved desperate to monitor riskiness, and to 
withdraw insurance at the first sign of trouble ahead.  Finally, those subject to multiple liability could 
try to avoid the penalty by shifting their wealth to other family members, or to close friends. Again, 
we would not be overly concerned about this possibility. It would lead to a wider distribution of 
wealth; and it would put such strain on family and friendship links in the case of failures that the 
principals involved would only be prepared to shift wealth up to a point. In any case, as noted earlier, 
we doubt whether managers often have the ability accurately to foresee the probability of their own 
subsequent failures. So, to conclude, while there would certainly be avoidance measures taken, we do 
not think that these would be so extensive and successful as to limit or abrogate the purpose and value 
of the proposal that we make, which would need to be statutorily mandated. 
The change-over from unlimited liability to limited liability towards the end of the 19th century was a 
relatively slow process, taking decades, depending in some large part on experience.  While we 
believe that a generalised shift to a two tier system of equity liability is the ultimate objective to which 
we should strive, doing so in one huge jump would be impractical.  We would have had insufficient 
prior experience of how such a system would work; the political opposition would be great, even if 
patently self-interested; the transitional costs would be huge. 
So we would want to introduce such a reform on a more gradual basis, starting with the sector where 
it seems most appropriate.  In this respect we would take a leaf out of Peter Conti Brown’s proposal.  
He suggests making SIFIs subject either to much higher capital or to making all shareholders subject 
to unlimited liability.  But the weakness of his proposal is the unfairness, and political unpopularity, 
of bankrupting innocent, uninformed and powerless outside shareholders.  What we would suggest, 
instead, is to give such SIFIs the alternatives of much higher capital, or adopting a two tier equity 
system along the lines outlined above.  Only the SIFI’s CEO might then have unlimited liability, but 
other insiders would have multiple liability along the lines outlined above. 
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V. Some Extensions 
 
Additional categories of ‘insiders’ could be the auditors of the firm, and its Credit Ratings Agencies 
(even though neither of them are shareholders).  In both cases, auditors and CRAs have privileged 
access to insider information, if they so want, and they provide publicly available information on 
which investors and counterparties rely.  If they take an unduly optimistic view of the prospects of a 
firm, possibly because they become influenced by the fact that they are remunerated by that firm, then 
that needs correction and should be subject to sanction.  The auditors might have liability equal to 
twice their accumulated revenue from the failing firm, with the same taper on replacement and ability 
to warn the regulator privately as already described. 
Devising appropriate sanctions for CRAs is considerably more difficult.  What they do is to offer an 
ordinal ranking of credit default risk.  The concern is that they may be excessively prone to optimism, 
because of a bias related to themselves being remunerated by the firm being rated.  The ill effect of 
any such optimism would be seen by the CRA maintaining an excessively high rating, such as AAA, 
almost up to the very date of default.  What one could do is to look at possibly three dates prior to the 
announcement to default, say two weeks prior, four months prior and one year prior, then if the rating 
was above D two weeks prior, or above B- four months prior and above A- one year prior, then the 
CRA involved could suffer a sanction.  That sanction could be further calibrated to be more severe, 
the higher above the trigger level the rating at each date remained.  The point of the exercise is to try 
to ensure that CRAs react reasonably promptly to any worsening in their firm’s conditions sufficiently 
far in advance to provide a reasonable warning signal.  Admittedly this could cause a hair-trigger 
problem, with rating agencies rushing to protect themselves against penalties as difficulties become 
apparent, and thereby worsening confidence.  The calibration in this case might be quite complex, but 
might be feasible.  This problem deserves more thought. 
A further extension might relate to the imposition of (judicial) fines on companies for bad behaviour.  
At present the fine is levied on the company as a whole, thereby reducing the residual value of the 
company, and the market value of all shares.  Thus the fine is effectively imposed on all shareholders.  
But outside shareholders, e.g. in BP for a risky form of drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, and on banks 
for money laundering, e.g. Danske Bank, had no knowledge whatsoever, nor power to influence the 
decisions that led to such bad behaviour.  So, the innocent are being punished for crimes for which 
they were guiltless.  Furthermore, the fine weakens the capital value of the firm involved, often at just 
the time when they need a larger buffer to survive under adverse circumstances.   
A much better way of proceeding would be to levy such fines only on insider shareholders.  Almost 
by definition, such insiders should have had the information and power to affect the decisions that led 
up to the bad behaviour.  Even in those frequent cases where some insiders did not have the 
information, the threat of more focussed penalty would make the insiders concerned to enhance risk 
management and compliance.  Admittedly the scale of such fines would have to be lessened, because 
the available wealth of the insiders is more strictly limited.  But the purpose of such fines should 
never be to provide fiscal support, but rather to deter such bad behaviour in future.  The more 
focussed the fines are on those insiders with power and information, the more likely it is that those 
fines will have the desired effect. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
There are many classes of debt, with various degrees of seniority.  The purpose of this paper is to 
suggest that, similarly, there should be two classes of equity.  The division should be between 
outsiders with no inside knowledge of the working of the firm, and/or ability to control its decisions, 
and insiders who have both the information and capacity to influence corporate decision-making.  
On the upside, when the bank/company is profitable, the interests of the insiders and outsiders 
would remain exactly aligned with each other, as at present.  But limited liability applied generally 
leads to moral hazard and an excessive tendency to take risks, since bad outcomes can lead to costs 
being shifted to blameless outsiders and other stakeholders.  The purpose of this proposal would be 
to shift the costs of failure back towards those who have the responsibility for taking these 
decisions.  Whether, or not, the failure was due to consciously excessive risk-taking, or other moral 
failings, failures will have serious costs and consequences.  These need to be shared more fairly 
amongst those responsible for such decisions, alongside other stakeholders who get adversely 
affected by such outcomes.  
A further concluding observation relates to the potential interaction between extended liability for 
managers/insiders and regulation.  The more that managers/insiders are required to take on 
additional liability, the less intrusive and extensive the regulation would need to be, given the 
internalisation of costs that such extended liability would entail.  In particular, firms like C. Hoare & 
Co., who voluntarily choose to adopt unlimited liability should have the intensity of supervision and 
regulation greatly lessened. 
 
